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Abstract
We analyze a class of sender-receiver games with quadratic payo¤s, which includes
the communication games in Alonso, Dessein and Matouschek (2008) and Rantakari
(2008) as special cases, for which the receivers maximum expected payo¤when players
have access to arbitrary, mediated communication protocols is attained in one-round
of face-to-face, unmediated cheap talk. This result is based on the existence for these
games of a communication equilibrium with an innite number of partitions of the
state space. We provide explicit expressions for the maximum expected payo¤ of the
receiver, and illustrate its use by deriving new comparative statics of the quality of
optimal communication. For instance, a shift in the underlying uncertainty that reduces
expected conict can worsen the quality of communication.
JEL classication: C72, D70, D83.
Keywords: Communication equilibrium, information transmission, mediation, one-shot
cheap talk.
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1 Introduction
Conicting interests often hinder communication between informed experts and uninformed
decision makers. This is certainly the case in Crawford and Sobels classic contribution
where an informed sender strategically sends costless messages to an uninformed receiver,
i.e. the sender engages in cheap talk (Crawford and Sobel, (CS) 1982). CS considers one-shot
communication: the sender makes a single recommendation and the receiver immediately
makes a decision based on that recommendation. The fact that the sender can foresee the
e¤ect of his inuence, by anticipating how each recommendation will be interpreted and
which decision it will induce, implies that perfect information transmission is not credible.
The literature has since studied several communication protocols that improve the ef-
ciency of the one-shot equilibria in CS, for instance, by engaging in repeated rounds of
communication (Krishna and Morgan, 2004), by using a noisy channel (Blume, Board and
Kawamura, 2007), by appealing to a correlation device on which to base the encoding and
decoding of messages (Blume, 2012) or, more generally, by relying on a trustworthy, or
even strategic, mediator (Goltsman, Horner, Pavlov and Squintani (GHPS), 2009; Ivanov,
2009).1 A driving force behind these e¢ ciency-enhancing communication protocols is that
they introduce noise in the senders message: a communication protocol that induces noisier
recommendations for decisions that on average favor the sender can discipline a risk-averse
sender and thus enhance information transmission.
In this vein, a natural question is when general communication protocols, including me-
diated communication, can improve upon one-shot communication and to understand when
these gains from mediation are likely to be either large or small. A limitation of this strand of
literature to address this question is that e¢ ciency bounds of communication equilibria exist
only for the leading example in CS; the characterization of optimal mediation in Goltsman,
Horner, Pavlov and Squintani (GHPS) (2009) is done for the case of quadratic preferences,
constant bias between sender and receiver and a uniformly distributed state. We extend the
analysis of GHPS to a broader class of sender-receiver games and study the structure of the
1The role of mediation with nite messages is considered in Ganguly and Ray (2012). Ambrus et al (2010)
examine hierarchical cheap talk where the messages get passed through a sequence of agents and show that
mixed-strategy equilibria can exist that dominate the direct communication game.
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payo¤ set supported by communication equilibria.
Our main result is a characterization of a class of sender-receiver games for which there
exists a one-shot, unmediated communication equilibrium for which the receivers expected
payo¤ cannot be improved upon by using arbitrary mediation rules (Proposition 2). That
is, for these games the receiver obtains no e¢ ciency gains from prolonged conversations,
using noisy channels or arbitrary mediation; brief conversations are optimal. In particular,
the cheap talk equilibrium that achieves the maximum of the receivers payo¤ supports an
innite number of di¤erent decisions. That is, brief conversations that are optimal are also
very detailed. Importantly, the class of sender-receiver games for which this is true includes
the communication games in Alonso, Dessein and Matouschek (2008) and Rantakari (2008),
where the bias between the sender and the receiver is linear and increasing and vanishes at
some point of the state space.2
One lesson from GHPS is that the gains from mediation with respect to the most e¢ cient
equilibrium in CS are highest for intermediate levels of conict. Indeed, as the conict
vanishes one-shot communication approaches full revelation while intensifying the conict
leads to no information transmission, even in the presence of a mediator. Our results show,
however, that it is not only the magnitude of the conict that determines the gains from
mediation but also its shape. Indeed, Proposition 2 imposes no constraints on the average
conict (as measured by the expected bias between the sender and the receiver). Therefore,
for any level of expected conict one can nd a sender-receiver game in our setup where the
receiver does not gain from mediation.
Apart from the insights on the gains from mediation, this result has also a more practical
appeal. The cheap talk model in CS, and specically their leading example, has been a
workhorse model in applications featuring costless communication, where the restriction to
one-shot communication has often been defended on tractability grounds. A concern with
this approach, however, is that the insights derived in such settings may not be robust to the
parties agreeing to switch to welfare-improving communication protocols. However, for the
class of games and the one-shot innite equilibrium in those games identied in Proposition
2, the receiver cannot strictly gain from having access to a neutral mediator. This implies,
2See also Alonso (2007) and Gordon (2010). A single round of unmediated communication obtains the
upper bound on the principals payo¤ also in Rantakari (2013).
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for instance, that the comparative statics in Alonso, Dessein and Matouschek (2008) and
Rantakari (2008) are derived under optimal communication.
Finally, we explicitly compute the receivers maximum expected payo¤ when brief con-
versations are indeed optimal (Proposition 3). This result is of separate applied interest, as
it provides the loss due to strategic communication without explicitly solving for the equi-
librium itself and for distributions other than the uniform distribution. We illustrate the use
of this result by deriving new comparative statics on optimal communication. For instance,
we show by example that a shift in the underlying distribution that reduces the expected
conict can actually worsen communication (Corollary 2).
The basic logic of the analysis is as follows. First, the revelation principle allows us to
restrict attention to games where the sender privately and truthfully discloses the state to
a mediator, who in turn issues a recommendation to the receiver which the latter is willing
to follow. The need to ensure the senders sincerity and the receivers obedience implies
that, for games with quadratic payo¤s, interim and ex-ante payo¤s can be expressed as
linear functionals of state-contingent average decisions (Lemma 1). From this representation
we identify a class of games for which a tight relationship exists between local and global
properties of the communication equilibria: the interim payo¤ to the sender for either the
lowest or the highest type is a linear function of the ex-ante payo¤ to the sender or the
receiver (Proposition 1). Therefore globally optimal communication equilibria must also be
locally optimal for either the highest or the lowest type of sender. We then show that if
the sender and the receiver are perfectly aligned for either the highest or the lowest state,
then there exists a one-shot innite communication equilibrium such that communication is
very detailed around the state of perfect alignment. In particular, an extreme type of sender
is able to fully reveal his type, and thus to obtain his preferred decision with certainty.
Since local properties of extreme types translate to global properties for these games, perfect
communication for an extreme type implies that this communication equilibrium is also ex-
ante optimal for the receiver. Moreover, this logic then naturally extends to settings where
the point of alignment is interior, when we can split the communication game around this
point of alignment
Our paper follows the recent literature that analyzes the gains from adopting more so-
phisticated communication protocols in sender-receiver games. The paper most related to
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ours is GHPS, who studies di¤erent conict resolution procedures, among them optimal me-
diation. While we expand their methodology to a broader class of games, our focus is on
characterizing the class of games where one-shot communication is optimal. Ivanov (2013)
provides su¢ cient conditions for mediation to be valuable, that is, for the receiver to benet
at all from communicating with the sender. Finally, Blume (2012) is also concerned with op-
timal mediation involving one-shot communication. In particular, Blume (2012) shows that
the e¢ ciency bound reported by GHPS for the leading example in CS can be achieved in
one-shot communication if parties can rely on a correlation device that sends private signals
before the sender becomes informed.3 In contrast, in our paper optimal communication is
face-to-face and does not rely on the use of a correlation device.
2 The Model
There are two players, the informed sender (he) and the uninformed receiver (she). The
payo¤s to both players depend on the realized state of nature  2  = [0; 1] and the chosen
action y 2 Y  R: The state of nature is distributed according to the distribution F ()
which admits a continuous density f() with full support on . The payo¤s of the receiver
and the sender are
uR(y; ) =   (y   )2 ; (1)
uS(y; ) =   (y   yS())2 ;
where yS() is a di¤erentiable function of the state. In our specication, the senders pre-
ferred action matches the realized state  while the receivers preferred action is yS(), where
the bias b () = yS()   measures the distance between the senders and the receivers pre-
ferred choices. Apart from the di¤erentiability requirement, we dont impose any additional
assumptions on the shape of yS(). In particular, for our representation in Lemma 1 we
dont require yS() to be non-decreasing.
While the sender observes ; the receiver has authority over the action y: Prior to the
receiver selecting an action, the players exchange messages according to a xed commu-
nication protocol. While communication protocols may involve complex communication
3For implementation in correlated equilibria, see also Vida and Forges (2013).
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procedures with multiple rounds in which messages are exchanged, possibly with the help
of a trustworthy mediator, the revelation principle applies: any equilibrium outcome of any
sender-receiver game with communication can be replicated by a (canonical) communication
equilibrium (Forges, 1986; Myerson, 1986). A communication equilibrium involves the use
of a neutral mediator to which the informed party sends a single, private, costless message,
which is a report of the state of nature, after which the mediator issues a recommendation
to the receiver. Moreover, in a communication equilibrium the sender is sincere and the
receiver obedient: reporting the true state is optimal for the sender, and abiding by the
mediators recommendation is optimal for the receiver. We can then restrict our attention
to communication equilibria where the message space is the type space  and the space of
mediator recommendations is the action space Y . Moreover, the receivers preferred choice
for any belief she may have about  cannot fall outside [0; 1]: Therefore, we can set Y = [0; 1].
Let F = B(Y ) be the Borel -algebra in Y . Formally, a mediation rule M is a family
of probability measures on (Y;F) indexed by , fp (:j)g2, that completely describe the
mediators behavior: the mediators recommendation is distributed according to the measure
p (yj) following a report . Moreover, to ensure the senders sincerity and the receivers
obedience, the family fp (:j)g2 must satisfyZ
Y
  (y   yS())2 (dp (yj)  dp (yj0))  0; 8; 0 2 : (IC-S)
y = E [jy] ; 8y 2 Y: (IC-R)
The constraint (IC-S) is the senders truthtelling constraint: the sender has no incentive
to misrepresent the state when the mediator commits to randomizing its recommendation
according to p

yj~

following a report ~. The constraint (IC-R) ensures the receivers
obedience: given the mediation rule fp (:j)g2 ; and given the senders truthtelling behavior,
the mediators recommendation renes the receivers belief about the realized state. Then
(IC-R) simply states that whenever the mediator recommends action y, the receivers optimal
action given her updated beliefs over the state is indeed y. The particular form of (IC-R)
follows from the fact that, with quadratic payo¤s, the decision makers optimal action given
her beliefs equals the expected state. A mediation rule that simultaneously satises (IC-R)
and (IC-S) is called incentive compatible.
We are interested in mediation rules that maximize the ex-ante welfare of the receiver.
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We refer to a mediation rule as unimprovable for a player, if there is no incentive compatible
mediation rule that yields a higher ex-ante expected payo¤ for that player. An optimal
mediation rule is thus an incentive compatible mediation rule that is unimprovable for the
receiver. Our quadratic setup allows also a simple informational interpretation of optimal
mediation rules. Indeed, given the receivers behavior (IC-R) and the functional form of
the receivers preferences (1), the receivers payo¤ coincides with her residual variance after
listening to the mediators recommendation. Therefore optimal mediation rules also maxi-
mize the amount of information that is transmitted, when the informativeness of a signal is
measured in terms of its expected residual variance.
We are particularly interested in a class of sender-receiver games where optimal mediation
can be achieved through brief conversations. To be specic, we dene a brief conversation as
a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of a game in which the sender sends a single, costless message
observed by the receiver who then takes an action. That is, a brief conversation is the
Nash equilibrium of a one-shot, face-to-face, unmediated cheap talk game. Formally, a brief
conversation is characterized by (i.) the senders communication rule () : ! M which
species the probability of sending message m 2 M conditional on observing state , (ii.)
the receivers response y(m) : M ! Y which maps messages into actions and (iii.) the
receivers belief function g( j m) : M !  which states the posterior probability of 
after observing message m. In a Bayesian-Nash Equilibrium, the communication rule is
optimal for the sender given the receivers response, the receivers response is optimal for the
receiver given the belief function and the belief function is derived from the communication
rule using Bayesrule whenever possible.
3 Analysis
We start by deriving an alternative representation of the equilibrium payo¤s induced by a
communication equilibrium. To this end, let US () be the senders interim payo¤ when the
state is , and VS and VR the ex-ante expected payo¤s of the sender and the receiver in a
given communication equilibrium. As in GHPS, for any incentive compatible M , dened by
fp (:j)g2, let y() =
Z
Y
ydp (yj) and 2() =
Z
Y
(y   y())2 dp (yj) be the equilibrium
expected decision and variance of the decision. Quadratic payo¤s are convenient as knowledge
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of y() and 2() su¢ ces to obtain the state-dependent payo¤s for any mediation rule.
Indeed, one immediately has
US () =   (y()  yS())2   2();
VS =  E

(y()  yS())2
  E 2() ;
VR =  E

(y()  )2  E 2() :
In principle, knowledge of both values y() and 2() would be required to obtain US () ;
 2 [0; 1], and knowledge of the functions y and 2 would be necessary to deduce VS and VR.
However, the restrictions imposed on the set of equilibrium payo¤s by (IC-S) and (IC-R)
imply that, for games with quadratic payo¤s, interim and ex-ante payo¤s can be obtained
solely on the basis of the state-contingent average decision y () ;  2 [0; 1].
Lemma 1 Let M be an incentive compatible mediation rule that induces in equilibrium y()
and 2(); 2 [0; 1]. Then
US

^

= E
h
y()KS(^) ()
i
  y2S(^); ^ 2 [0; 1]; (2)
VS = E [y()KS ()]  E

y2S()

; (3)
VR = E [y()KR ()]  E

2

; (4)
where, letting I[0;^] be the characteristic function of the set [0; ^], we have
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KS(^) () = 2yS()     2
y0S()
f()

1  F ()  I[0;^]()

; (5)
KS () = 2yS()  ;
KR () = :
Lemma 1 provides expressions for US () ; VS and VR as a¢ ne functionals of the average
decision y without explicit recourse to either 2 or to any additional information of the
mechanism M . Lemma 1 is analogous to well known results in mechanism design with
quasilinear utility and convex type spaces: if y() plays the role of an "allocation" and
2() (which enters additively in US ()) plays the role of a type-dependent transfer, then
an application of the envelope theorem to (IC-S) implies that US () can be obtained from
4The characteristic function of the set A; IA, is such that IA(x) = 1 if x 2 A and IA(x) = 0 otherwise.
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knowledge of the interim payo¤ of one type and the entire allocation y();  2 [0; 1]. Under
mediation, however, we must also ensure that the receiver is obedient, i.e. (IC-R) must also
hold. Lemma 1 shows that this additional constraint eliminates the degree of freedom in
specifying the interim payo¤ to a xed senders type. That is, knowledge of the "allocation"
y su¢ ces to compute both interim and ex-ante expected payo¤s. Note, however, that Lemma
1 remains silent on the set of implementable y. For example, the conict of interest may be so
severe that only a babbling equilibrium can be sustained (and thus the set of implementable
y is a singleton), which nevertheless would still satisfy (2), (3) and (4).
3.1 Interim and ex-ante payo¤s under mediation.
In principle, if the space of implementable y is su¢ ciently rich, one may conjecture that
knowledge of US () for some type  is not enough to derive US (
0) for some other type 0, and
would also be insu¢ cient to infer the ex-ante welfare of the sender and the receiver. In other
words, if the set of mediation rules is su¢ ciently rich one would expect that mediation rules
that exhibit the same local behavior, by inducing the same US () for some type ; may have
widely di¤erent global properties and thus generate di¤erent ex-ante payo¤s. By contrast, the
following proposition characterizes a class of sender-receiver games in which local behavior
univocally determines the global welfare properties of any incentive compatible mediation
rule. For the remainder of this paper let h() = f()= (1  F ()) and r() = f()=F () be
the hazard rate and reversed hazard rate of the distribution F ().
Proposition 1 Suppose that, for some ;  2 R; yS() takes one of the following forms
yS() = E
h
~j~  
i
+ ; (6)
yS() = E
h
~j~  
i
+ ; (7)
yS () = 
Z 
0
h(0)d0 + ; (8)
yS () = 
Z 
0
r(0)d0 + : (9)
(i) If either (6) or (7) holds, then for any two mediation rules M and M 0 we have
UM
0
S (i)  UMS (i) = (2  1)

V M
0
R   V MR

; (10)
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where i = 0 if yS() satises (6), while i = 1 if yS() satises (7).
(ii) If either (8) or (9) holds, then for any two mediation rules M and M 0 we have
UM
0
S (i)  UMS (i) = V M
0
S   V MS ; (11)
where i = 0 if yS() satises (8), while i = 1 if yS() satises (9).
We can interpret Proposition 1 as a renement of Lemma 1. Lemma 1 shows that
knowledge of the function y is su¢ cient to compute ex-ante and interim payo¤s for any
incentive compatible M . Nevertheless, the functional di¤erence in the linear functionals
dening (2), (3) and (4) implies that two average decisions y and y0 that induce the same
US () for some type  may very well yield di¤erent ex-ante payo¤s. Adding more structure
to our model, however, can lead to an equivalence between local interim payo¤s and global
ex-ante payo¤s. For instance, if yS() can be written as (6) or (7), then a linear relation
exists between the expected payo¤ to the receiver and the payo¤ to the sender at an extreme
type for any incentive compatible mediation rule, while if either (8) or (9) holds then the
change in the ex-ante payo¤ to the sender when switching from M to M 0 equals the change
in the payo¤ to an extreme type.
The intuition behind Proposition 1-i and 1-ii is based on the representation (2),(3) and
(4) in Lemma 1 coupled with the obedience constraint by the receiver (IC-R). Suppose
that (6) holds. Then, the function yS()   y0S()=h() is linear in the state, implying that
KS(0), obtained by setting ^ = 0 in (5), can be expressed as an a¢ ne function of KR,
which denes the expected utility of the receiver. The nal step is to observe that the law
of the iterated expectations applied to (IC-R) implies that E [y()] is constant across all
mediation mechanisms (and equal to E []). Then (10) follows immediately from Lemma 1
as E

y()KS(0) ()

is a linear transformation of E [y()KR ()] in the set of implementable y.
Similar reasoning shows that E

y()KS(1) ()

and E [y()KR ()] are linearly related if (7)
holds. Conversely, if (8) holds then KS(0) () KS () is a constant, while KS(1) () KS ()
is constant if (9) holds. Again, as E [y()] is constant over the space of mediation rules then
either case would imply (11).
We note that both (6) and (7) hold if the senders preferred decision is an a¢ ne function
of the state and the state is uniformly distributed.5 This includes the leading example in CS,
5We leave the analysis of other cases that satisfy (6) to Section 4.1.
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which has been the workhorse model in applications involving cheap talk communication.
Indeed, the main studies of optimal mediation in CS-type of games all consider this "uniform-
quadratic" example (see, Krishna and Morgan, 2004; Blume et al, 2007; GHPS; Ivanov, 2010;
Blume, 2012). In fact, for this case we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Suppose that  is uniformly distributed and yS() = a + b. Then, if a > 1=2
the following statements are equivalent: (i) an optimal mediation rule maximizes VS, (ii)
an optimal mediation rule maximizes US (0) and (iii) an optimal mediation rule maximizes
US (1).
The observation that optimal mediation maximizes US (0) is exploited by GHPS to char-
acterize the optimal mediation rule for the constant bias case (i.e. when a = 1, b 6= 0):
Interestingly, as long as a > 1=2 a senders optimal mediation rule must also lead to the
maximum payo¤ for the sender at the extremes of the type space, as well as when comput-
ing the senders payo¤ at an ex-ante stage.
We end this section with two caveats regarding Proposition 1. First, the equivalence
(10) establishes a bijection in terms of payo¤s, not decisions or even average decisions. That
is, if either (6) or (7) holds, then di¤erent mediation rules that yield the same expected
utility for the receiver (and thus for either the lowest or highest type of sender) may induce
totally di¤erent decisions. This is simple to see by noting that in the constant bias-uniform
specication and for the range of biases in which a three partition equilibrium is feasible,
one can construct a mediation rule that induces either the babbling equilibrium or the
three partition equilibrium with xed probabilities and such that the expected payo¤ to the
sender is the same at the extreme types as the two partition cheap talk equilibrium. Clearly,
however, average decisions cannot coincide under both communication rules. Second, either
(6) or (7) are only su¢ cient for the existence of a bijection between US (0) or US (1) and
VR, as we dont incorporate information about the set of implementable y. For instance, a
bijection would trivially follow when the conict of preferences between sender and receiver
is so severe that any incentive compatible mediation rule implements a single decision.
10
4 Art of Brevity
We now turn our attention to optimal mediation rules, and study when they involve brief
conversations. For the cases that satisfy (6) or (7) with  > 1=2, Proposition 1 establishes
thatM is optimal if and only if the senders payo¤ in state ^ = i 2 f0; 1g cannot be improved
by any other mediation rule. Clearly, US (i)  0 and US (i) = 0 if and only if the receiver
selects the senders preferred decision when his type is i. The next proposition describes a
class of games that satisfy (6) or (7) and admit a brief conversation where the receiver selects
the senders preferred decision at an extreme type, and this brief conversation must then be
optimal.
Proposition 2 Suppose that either
yS() = 

E
h
~j~  
i
  E
h
~
i
; with  > max
2[0;1]

E
h
~j~  
i
  E
h
~
i ; (12)
or
yS() = 

E
h
~j~  
i
  E
h
~
i
+ 1; with  > max
2[0;1]
1  
E
h
~
i
  E
h
~j~  
i : (13)
Then, there exists a brief conversation that is unimprovable for the receiver. Importantly, this
equilibrium induces an innite number of di¤erent decisions, where y = 0 is an accumulation
point if (12) holds, and y = 1 is an accumulation point if (13) holds.
A notable feature of (12) and (13) is that they require full alignment between sender
and receiver at some extreme type.6 Thus Proposition 2 rules out the sender-receiver games
studied in CS where preferred decisions of sender and receiver never coincide. These types
of games, with an innite type- and action-space and where the bias b() may vanish or
even change sign, have been studied by Gordon (2010) who characterizes communication
equilibria and provides conditions for the existence of innite equilibria.
The logic behind Proposition 2 can be seen in two steps. First, the existence of a state of
full alignment implies in our case that an innite equilibrium exists. This is not immediate as
Alonso (2007) and Gordon (2010) show that even if the bias vanishes at some state only nite
6Alternatively, the point of alignment may be some interior 0; where (12) holds for   0; conditional
on  2 [0; 1] while (13) holds for   0; conditional on  2 [0; 0]:
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equilibria maybe possible. However, either (12) or (13) imply that the range of preferred
decisions of the sender contains the range of preferred decisions of the receiver (i.e. the
sender is more reactive than the receiver) and thus Theorem 2 in Gordon (2010) guarantees
the existence of an innite equilibrium. Second, an innite equilibrium on a bounded state
space must necessarily have an accumulation point at a state at which the bias disappears.
This implies that an innite equilibrium guarantees that the receiver selects the senders (and
receivers) preferred decision at some of point of alignment. Then (12) or (13) guarantee that
there is a unique point of alignment, which occurs at an extreme type. For instance, (12)
implies that yS() >  for  > 1, thus the only point of congruence is at  = 0 implying that
the innite equilibrium must necessarily have the sender of type  = 0 inducing decision
y = 0. As this equilibrium maximizes the senderpayo¤ at  = 0, it must also be optimal
for the receiver. Therefore, when (12) or (13) holds brief conversations that are optimal are
very detailed around the point of full alignment.
An important implication of Proposition 2 is that the one-shot communication equi-
librium characterized in many applied papers cannot be improved upon by having more
rounds of communication, communicating through a noisy channel, or, more generally, by
employing a neutral mediator. For example, Melumad and Shibano (1991), Stein (2002),
Alonso, Dessein and Matouschek (2008) and Rantakari (2008) study communication games
which are equivalent to sender-receiver games with preferences over actions given by (1) with
yS() = a; a > 1; and   U [0; 1]. Note that this case satises (12) with  = 2a. Propo-
sition 2 then establishes that the innite equilibrium studied in those papers is necessarily
the optimal communication protocol for the receiver. The relevance of this observation is
that it addresses a typical concern regarding applied models with cheap talk communication,
namely, that the results and insights may not be robust to the receiver adopting a more in-
formative communication protocol. For instance, Proposition 2 implies that the ndings in
Alonso, Dessein and Matouschek (2008) and Rantakari (2008) regarding the impact of inter-
nal communication on organizational structure are obtain under the optimal communication
protocol.
There are other well known cases where brief conversations are optimal. First, when
the conict of interest between the sender and the receiver is extreme, either because the
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di¤erence between preferred actions is large for states that are very likely7 or because the
senders preferred decision decreases with the state, then the receiver cannot do better than
simply choosing her preferred uninformed decision. In this case, optimal conversations are
necessarily brief as nothing can be credibly communicated. The equilibria described in
Proposition 2, however, always involve inuential communication and the receiver strictly
benets from the senders recommendation. Second, a more subtle example is presented in
GHPS were they show that in the leading example of CS, when the constant bias b satises
b = 1=(2N2) for some integer N; the most informative C-S equilibrium (which involves
N di¤erent decisions) is unimprovable through mediation. That is, the constant bias case
admits a non-generic set of cases where brief conversations are optimal.8 In contrast, applying
Proposition 2 one can construct sender-receiver games, as we do in Section 4.1, for which all
games have a brief conversation that is optimal.
It is instructive to contrast the ndings in the literature on optimal mediation in CS-
type of games to Proposition 2. For the leading example in CS one has that: (i) For
b  1=2 no information transmission is possible, (ii) for b < 1=2, one-shot communication is
generically not optimal, and (iii) if b < 1=8 multiple rounds of unmediated communication
can achieve the maximum payo¤ (see GHPS for details).9 In short, employing a mediator
is most valuable when the conict of interest is intermediate, since for small biases several
rounds of cheap talk is unimprovable through mediation, while if the conict is extreme
no meaningful communication is possible, even with a neutral mediator. Further, one-shot
communication can, generically, be improved upon either through long conversations or
mediation.
We nd however that for a state-dependent conict of interest, the gains from mediation
depend not only on the magnitude of the conict of interest (as given by the expected bias),
7For instance, it is well known that for the leading example in CS, no inuential communication is possible
for b > 1=2. Moreover, as a simple corollary of Proposition 2, if yS() = 

E
h
~j~  
i
  E
h
~
i
+ E
h
~
i
then yS(0) = E[] and an optimal mediation rule implements a constant decision y = E[]. Note that this
condition is compatible with a unifomly small bias in [0; 1].
8As we noted in Corollary 1, the leading example in CS satises (10). The cases with b = 1=(2N2) are
optimal as the sender at  = 0 obtains his preferred decision.
9More generally, Ivanov (2013) provides a simple su¢ cient condition for information transmission to be
possible in sender-receiver games.
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but also on the shape of the bias b(). Indeed, (12) imposes no upper limit on the value of
 while the expected conict increases without bound as  increases. The key di¤erence,
however, with the constant bias case is that in spite of an increased average conict, full
alignment at an extreme type persists and inuential communication remains feasible.
4.1 Brief conversations, Uncertainty and the Quality of Commu-
nication
While the cheap talk setting of CS has found wide acceptance as a model of communica-
tion under conicting preferences, applications have generally restricted attention to the
"uniform-quadratic" example as expressions for the payo¤s in models beyond that case have
proven di¢ cult to come by. However, for the class of sender-receiver games characterized in
Proposition 2 we can explicitly compute the ex-ante payo¤ to the receiver under an optimal
communication equilibrium.
Proposition 3 For every yi 1; yi 2 Y , yi 1 < yi, dene g (yi 1; yi) by
g (yi 1; yi) = E [j 2 [yi 1; yi]] : (14)
If yS() satises (12), then the maximum expected payo¤ of the receiver is
V R =  E

2

+ (1  F (y)) g2 (0; 1) g
2 (y; 1)  g2 (0; y)
g2 (0; 1)  g2 (0; y) (15)
with y 2 (0; 1) the unique solution to
2 (g (y; 1)  g (0; 1)) = g (0; y) + g (y; 1) : (16)
To derive (15), the proof of the proposition constructs two incentive compatible mech-
anisms that give the sender the same interim utility at  = 0. The rst mechanism is
equivalent to a two partition equilibrium where the sender only reports whether his type ex-
ceeds a threshold y. Truthtelling by the sender and obedience by the receiver requires this
threshold to satisfy the "arbitrage" condition (16). To dene the second mechanism, M,
let M be the mechanism that implements the innite equilbrium described in Proposition
2-i, and let M? be the totally uninformative mediation rule (i.e. the babbling equilibrium).
Then after the senders report, with probability  M issues a recommendation according to
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M?, while with probability 1    it follows M. The probability  is chosen such that the
two partition equilibrium and M yield the same US (0). Then the linear relation (10) for
games where yS() satises (6) implies that these two mechanisms must generate the same
ex-ante payo¤s for the receiver, from which we deduce that V R satises (15).
We now use (15) to compare V R for di¤erent distributions of the state. To ensure that
comparative statics follow from changes in the distribution rather than the bias, in the next
corollary we study three examples where the application of (12) leads to a senders linear
preferred decision yS() = a.
Example 1 (exponential). For each truncated exponential f(; ; ) = e =(1  
e );  2 [0; ]; let yS(; ; ) be given by (12). Then f(; ; ) converges pointwise to e 
and yS(; ; ) converges pointwise to a as  ! 1, where a = .10 Finally, the limit
variance of the truncated exponentials is the variance of an exponential 1=2.
Example 2 (linear) Consider a linear pdf that vanishes at the upper bound of the
support, f() = 2l (1 

l
);  2 [0; l], with V ar [] = 2l =18. Then, applying (12), we obtain
yS() = a with a = 2=3.
Example 3 (uniform) Finally, applying (12) to a uniform distribution f() = 1u ;  2
[0; u], with V ar [] = 
2
u=12; we have yS() = a with a = =2:
Corollary 2 (i) For a  1, the senders maximum expected payo¤ is
V R =  
x(a  1)
xa  1 V ar [] ; (17)
where x = 2 for the limit of truncated exponentials, x = 3 for the linear case, and x = 4 for
the uniform case.11 (ii) Suppose that
2
3
<
u
l
<
s
4a  1
2(3a  1) and 3 < 
l <
r
12 (3a  1)
2a  1 : (18)
10See proof of Corollary 2.
11This expression for the uniform case already appears in Alonso, Dessein and Matouschek (2008) and
Rantakari (2008).
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Then the expected bias is highest for the uniform case while it is lowest for the limit of
truncated exponentials. However, the maximum expected payo¤ to the sender is highest for
the uniform case but lowest for the exponential case.
As expected, (17) shows that the quality of communication improves when the conict
between sender and receiver decreases (i.e. for lower a). More interestingly, the corollary
also shows that a shift in the distribution that lowers the expected bias E [yS()  ] can
actually worsen communication and lower the receivers expected payo¤ under an optimal
communication protocol. Indeed, Corollary 2-ii provides a range of parameter values such
that the distribution that leads to the the highest expected payo¤ for the receiver is also the
one with the highest expected conict.
Another way of stating this result is in terms of the receivers benet from communicating
with the sender relative to making an uninformed decision. To this end, dene the commu-
nication gain G = (V ar []  jV Rj)=V ar [] as the increase in the receivers knowledge of the
state due to communicating with the sender. From (17) the communication gain in our three
examples is G = (x  1) = (ax  1) : As this expression increases in x; the communication
gain is highest for a uniform distribution and lowest for the exponential distribution.
The intuition relies on the two separate roles that uncertainty plays in determining the
gains from communication. All equilibria are partitional equilibria where intervals become
smaller as one approaches the point of congruence at  = 0. Therefore, holding constant the
partition of the state space, a shift in the distribution that puts more mass on the states
where communication is more detailed can only improve the receivers payo¤. However, the
change in the distribution also changes the "arbitrage condition" determining the equilibrium
partition. Suppose that the principal knows that the state lies in [y; y+] so that her optimal
choice exceeds y by  (y;) = g (y; y +) y. That is,  (y;) measures the responsiveness
of the receiver when she knows that the state lies in an interval of length . Then for a
uniform  (y;) does not vary in y while it decreases in y for the linear case. That is, the
receiver becomes less responsive under a linear distribution than a uniform. To preserve
incentive compatibility by the sender, the size of the intervals must be larger for a linear
distribution so that the partitions are coarser under a linear distribution. Then Corollary
2-ii indicates that this second e¤ect dominates for the range of parameters in (18) and a
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lower expected conict actually leads to a lower expected payo¤ for the receiver.
5 Conclusion
The literature has emphasized the benecial role of mediation in sender-receiver games where
conicting preferences hinder information transmission. We have identied a class of games,
however, for which neither lengthy conversations nor mediation enhances the amount of
information exchanged in equilibrium. In short, brief conversations are optimal in these cases.
Importantly, the optimality of brief conversations persists even if the average conict between
the sender and the receiver is arbitrarily large. This shows that the value of mediation not
only depends on the magnitude of the conict between the sender and the receiver but also
on how this conict varies over the state space. In our case, as long as the conict vanishes
at one of the extreme points of the state space, brief conversations remain optimal.
Our proof of optimality of brief conversations (Proposition 2) relies on the existence of
a one-to-one relation between the senders interim payo¤s at extreme types and the ex-ante
expected payo¤s of the players. This bijection also implies that optimal mediation rules
are locally optimal for some senders type. A natural question is the extent to which this
assertion holds true in general. In other words, does an optimal mediation rule necessarily
maximize the interim utility of some senders type? Furthermore, our proofs made no use
of the characteristics of the set of implementable average decisions, as we rely instead on
properties of the payo¤ functions. Better understanding implementability can further our
understanding of the benets of mediation. We leave these two observations for future work.
.
A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1: Let M be an arbitrary incentive compatible mediation mechanism.
We will derive the relations (2), (3) and (4) in three steps. First, we have thatZ
Y
ydp(yj)dF () =
Z
Y
y
Z

dg(jy)

dH(y) =
Z
Y
y2dH(y); (19)
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where in the rst equality we apply the Fubini-Tonelli Theorem and the second equality
follows from (IC-R). Therefore, VR can be written as
VR =  
Z
Y
(y   )2dp(yj)dF () =  
Z
Y
 
y2   2y   2 dp(yj)dF ()
=
Z
Y
 
y   2 dp(yj)dF () = E [y()]  E 2 :
where we applied (19) to the third equality and the law of iterated expectations to the last
equality. This establishes (4) with KR () = .
Second, as utilities are quadratic and given (19) we immediately have
VS =  E

(y   yS())2

=  E y2   2yyS() + y2S() =
=  E y   2yyS() + y2S() =  E y() (   2yS()) + y2S() ; (20)
where we have again applied (19) to the third equality. This establishes (3) with KS () =
2yS()  .
Third, xing a probability measure p(j^) from the mechanism M; the function  
Z
Y
(y 
yS())
2dp(yj^) has the same smoothness properties as yS(). Our assumption that yS() is
di¤erentiable and Theorem 2 of Milgrom and Segal (2002) then imply that US () is absolutely
continuous, and for any two states  and 0 satises the integral representation
US (
0)  US () =
Z 0

Z
Y
2(y   yS())y0S()dp(yj)

d
= 2
Z 0

(y ()  yS()) y0S()d :
Fixing a reference state ~; integrating by parts, and rearranging we have
VS = US

~

  2
Z ~
0
(y ()  yS()) y0S()d + 2
Z 1
0
(y ()  yS()) y0S() (1  F ()) d
= US

~

+ E

y()

2y0S()
1  F ()
f ()
  2y
0
S()
f ()
I[0;~]

  E y2S()+ y2S(~)
where I[0;~] is the characteristic function of the set [0; ~] (i.e. I[0;~](x) = 1 if x 2 [0; ~] and
I[0;~](x) = 0 otherwise). Using the expression for VS given in (20) and substituting above we
obtain (2) with KS(^) given by (5). 
Proof of Proposition 1: (i) Suppose that (6) holds so that
y0S() = h () (E [
0j0  ]  ) ;
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implying
KS(0) () = 2yS()     2y0S()
1
h ()
= 2E [0j0  ] + 2      2 (  + E [0j0  ])
= (2  1) + 2 = (2  1)KR + 2:
Conversely, if (7) holds then
y0S() = r () (   E [0j0  ]) ;
so that
KS(1) () = 2yS()   + 2y0S()
1
r()
= 2E [0j0  ] + 2    + 2 (   E [0j0  ])
= (2  1) + 2 = (2  1)KR + 2
Let i = 0 if (6) holds, and i = 1 if (7) holds. Then,
US (i) = E

y()KS(i) ()
  y2S(i) = E [y() ((2  1)KR + 2)]  y2S(i) =
= (2  1)E [y()KR] + 2E [y()]  y2S(i)
= (2  1)VR + (2  1)E

2

+ 2E [y()]  y2S(i):
Applying the law of iterated expectations to (IC-R) one readily obtains
E [y()] = E [y] = E [E [jy]] = E [] : (21)
Therefore, for any incentive compatible mediation rule we have
US (i) = (2  1)VR + CR; (22)
withCR = (2 1)E

2

+2E [] y2S(i) nite and independent of the mediation mechanism.
This establishes (10). Finally, if  > 1=2 then (22) implies that there is a linear and increasing
relation between US (i) and the ex-ante payo¤ to the receiver VR. Therefore, a mediation
rule achieves the maximum US (i) if and only if it maximizes VR.
(ii) If y0S() = h () ; then KS(0) can be written as
KS(0) () = 2yS()     2 = KS ()  2;
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while if y0S() = r () ; then KS(1) can be written as
KS(1) () = 2yS()   + 2 = KS () + 2
As average decisions must equal the state (as shown in (21)), then letting i = 0 if (8) is
satised, and i = 1 if (9) is satised, we can write
US (i) = E

y()KS(i) ()
  y2S(i) = E [y()KS ()]  2(1  2i)E []  y2S(i) =
= VS + CS;
with CS =  2(1  2i)E []  y2S(i) nite and independent of the mediation mechanism, from
which (11) follows. 
Proof of Corollary 1: If yS() = a + b then clearly (6) and (7) are both satised with
 = 2a: Then (10) implies that if a > 1=4 a mediation rule is optimal if and only if it
maximizes US (i), i 2 f0; 1g: Moreover, as preferred decisions are linear, and applying both
(19) and (21) we have
VS =  E
 
y   (a + b)2 =  E y2   2ay   2by + (a + b)2 =
= (2a  1)E [y]  E  2by + (a + b)2 = (2a  1)VR + ~C
with ~C = E

(2a  1)2 + 2b   (a + b)2. Thus for a > 1=2; VS is increasing in VR: Overall,
if a > 1=2 we have that optimal mediation rules maximize the interim payo¤of extreme types,
and also the senders expected payo¤ and, conversely, any mechanism that maximizes the
interim payo¤ at an extreme state must necessarily be ex-ante optimal for both the sender
and the receiver. 
Proof of Proposition 2: Let YS = fy : yS() = yg which is a connected set given the
continuity of yS() as implied by either (12) or (13). Then, if either (12) or (13) holds
then [0; 1]  YS. This implies that the sender is reactive and an innite equilibrium exists
(Gordon 2010, Theorem 2). Furthermore if (12) holds then yS() >  for  2 (0; 1]: This
means that the unique point of alignment is  = 0 and the equilibrium with an innite
number of actions must necessarily have an accumulation point at y = yS(0) = 0; and thus
US (0) = 0. As (12) satises (6) and the bound condition on  guarantees  > 1 then (10)
holds and the innite equilibrium must be optimal. Conversely, if (13) holds then yS() < 
for  2 [0; 1): This means that the unique point of alignment is  = 1 and the equilibrium with
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an innite number of actions must necessarily have an accumulation point at y = yS(1) = 1
and US (1) = 1. As (13) satises (7) and the bound condition on  guarantees  > 1; then
(10) holds and the innite equilibrium must be optimal. 
Proof of Proposition 3: To obtain (15) we will use the relation (10) and the fact that
the set of implementable y is convex. To see this last point note that for any two incentive
compatible M 0 and M 00; that induce y0 and y00, a mediation rule that with probability 
issues recommendations according to M 0 and with probability 1  according to M 00;where,
importantly, the probability  does not vary with the report of the sender, is incentive
compatible and induces an average decision y0 + (1   )y00. Let M replicate the innite
equilibrium described in Proposition 2 and let M? replicate the babbling equilibrium (i.e.
under M? the receiver selects a single decision E [] is induced).
We now construct a two partition equilibrium of the cheap talk game when yS is given
by (12). In such equilibrium the sender only discloses whether the state is above or below
y, the receiver selects g (0; y) = E [j 2 [0; y]] if   y and g (y; 1) = E [j 2 [y; 1]]
otherwise, and y must satisfy the arbitrage condition
yS(y
)  g (0; y) = g (y; 1)  yS(y): (23)
As yS() that satises (12) can be expressed as yS() =  (g (; 1)  g (0; 1)) ; the existence
of a solution y 2 [0; 1] to (23) then requires the existence of a solution to
2 =
g (0; y) + g (y; 1)
g (y; 1)  g (0; 1) (24)
The right hand side of (24) is decreasing in y and achieves a minimum (1 + E[]) = (1  E[])
when y = 1. From (12) then we have
2 > max

E
h
~j~  
i
  E
h
~
i  2
1  E [] 
1 + E[]
1  E []
This implies that we can always nd an y that solves (24) and a two partition equilibrium
exists. Denote by M2 the mediation rule that induces this two partition equilibrium. The
receivers expected utility under M2 is
V M
2
R =  
Z y
0
(g (0; y)  )2 dF () 
Z 1
y
(g (y; 1)  )2 dF () =
=  E 2+ F (y) g2 (0; y) + (1  F (y)) g2 (y; 1) : (25)
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Next consider the mediation mechanism M that is a convex combination of M and M?,
that is with probability  the mechanism M issues the same recommendation as M? while
with probability 1   it issues the same recommendation as M. We then have
V M

R =  V ar + (1  )V

R : (26)
From Proposition 2, under the optimal one-shot equilibrium we have UM

S (0) = 0. Moreover,
UM
2
S (0) =  g2 (0; y) and UM?S =  g2 (0; 1) < UM2S (0). Therefore, there exists  such that
UM

S (0) = U
M2
S (0); which is then given by
 g2 (0; y) =  g2 (0; 1) + (1  )UMS (0);
 =
g2 (0; y)
g2 (0; 1)
; (27)
and (26) leads to
(1  )V MR = V M
2
R +
V ar
substituting the value  given by (27) and V M
2
R given by (25) into this expression one obtains
(15). 
Proof of Corollary 2: First consider a truncated exponential of parameter ; f() =
e 
1 e  ;  2 [0; ]: Then (12) translates to
yS() =

1  e ( )
 
   e ( )
 
1  e  
1  e 
!
;
and pointwise we have yS()!  as  !1: Taking the limit as  !1 to the arbitrage
condition (16) gives
2 (1  y (a  1)) = y

1  e y ;
and (15) gives
V R =  
2
2
+
1
2
"
1 +
y
 
1  e y
2 (1  e y)  ye y
#
=  2 (a  1)
2a  1
1
2
=  2 (a  1)
2a  1 V ar [] :
Now consider the linear case where (12) translates to yS() = 23 with
2
3
 > 1; implying
that  = 3
2
a with a > 1: The solution to (16) is
y =

1 
p
36a2   48a+ 17  1
6a  4

l;
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which, substituted in (15) leads to
V R =  
1
18

2
l
 3ly + 2l + (y)2
ly + 
2
l   (y)2
=  (a  1)
3a  1

2
l
6
=  3 (a  1)
3a  1 V ar [] :
Finally, consider the uniform case where (12) translates to yS() = 2  with

2
> 1; so that
 = 2a with a > 1: The solution to (16) is
y =
u
2 (2a  1) ;
which, substituted in (15) leads to
V R =  
u   2y
12
 
u + y
2u =
=   a  1
3 (4a  1)

2
u =  
4 (a  1)
4a  1 V ar [] :
Part ii, follows from the fact that expected bias for the exponential, linear and uniform
case are (a  1) =, (a  1) =3l and (a  1) =2u while the maximum expected payo¤ to the
receiver in each case is 2 (a  1) =2 (2a  1), (a  1) 2l = (18a  6) and (a  1) 2u= (12a  3).

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